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Giving attorneys more power in the voir dire (jury selection) process may allow them to 1) nd
grounds for dismissal of jurors whom they wish to strike on a priori grounds; 2) acquire information
that enables them to identify favorably-inclined jurors more precisely; or both. Attorneys who are more
skilled can better use such increased power to retain the jurors they prefer. We show theoretically
that, because defense attorneys prefer non-white jurors a priori, the interaction of empowerment and
defense attorney skill should produce juries with a greater proportion of non-whites if only the rst
mechanism is operative, but need not have this eect if the second is operative. We then examine these
issues using a detailed dataset on all non-capital felony trials in four large and diverse counties over a
two-year period. We nd that skilled and empowered attorneys can indeed stack juries by retaining
jurors predisposed to their side at a greater rate, and that the distribution of relative attorney skill in
our data is such that defendants benet on average. However, we nd that empowerment has a small
and insignicant impact on the racial composition of the seated jury, regardless of attorney skill.
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1 Introduction
Voir dire, more commonly known as jury selection, is the process by which a pool of potential
jurors is questioned and pared down to the seated jury that will eventually hear a trial. The legal
rationale for conducting voir dire, rather than simply drawing juries randomly from the population,
is to ensure that juries can act impartially and competently in rendering their verdicts. However,
there is a widespread notion that voir dire practices employed in many trials grant attorneys
too much freedom to shape the jury, leading instead to the seating of biased juries and to the
systematic exclusion of certain groups from jury service. Thus, jury selection is often perceived
as harming defendants by leading to unfair trial outcomes, harming potential jurors by facilitating
their discriminatory removal on the basis of race or other characteristics, and generally detracting
from the trustworthiness of the legal system.1
Our goal in this paper is to discover what attorneys can actually accomplish in voir dire. When
attorneys are granted more freedoms, will the jurors who make it through the jury selection process
be biased against defendants? Will they be less likely to belong to certain identiable groups?
We seek to answer these questions rst with a simple model of attorney behavior. Attorneys
on a given side are assumed to have the objective of retaining jurors who are favorably predisposed
to their side. Such predispositions are assumed to be correlated with an observable juror charac-
teristic, for example, race. When attorneys are unempowered { that is, when they have limited
freedoms in voir dire { they must pursue their objective by striking potential jurors according to
this characteristic. We model empowerment as having two potential eects: it can improve the
ability of attorneys to strike whichever potential jurors they choose to; and it can allow attorneys
to acquire more accurate information about the predispositions of potential jurors than can be
inferred from the observable characteristic alone. We allow the magnitude of both of these eects
to depend on the skill of the attorneys on each side.
The model predicts that, when attorneys are empowered, more skilled attorneys will have
greater success in retaining jurors favorably inclined to their side. Therefore, empowerment can
indeed lead to a seated jury that is more prejudiced against the defendant than a randomly-
drawn jury would be { but only when the prosecuting attorney holds a skill advantage over the
defense attorney. Empowerment can likewise lead to a seated jury that is prejudiced in favor of the
defendant when the defense attorney holds a skill advantage.
However, the model does not make a clear prediction concerning the eect of empowerment on
the distribution of seated jurors by the observable characteristic. If empowerment only increases
striking ability and prosecutors have an a priori preference for white jurors, they will leverage
1King (1993) discusses these categories of harm from the perspective of the evolution of related Supreme Court
decisions. Much of the popular and scholarly discussion on these matters focuses on exclusion from juries based on
race, and even more specically, on blacks excluded from juries in favor of whites. We take a broad perspective on the
potential to exclude jurors on the basis of any observable characteristics. However, we also recognize the prevalence
and importance of the focus on race, and adopt this focus ourselves in most of our empirical analysis.
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empowerment to strike non-white jurors at a higher rate. But defense attorneys will likewise
leverage empowerment to strike white jurors at a higher rate. If the defense attorney holds a skill
advantage, the overall eect of empowerment will be a greater proportion of non-whites on the
seated jury than in the pool of potential jurors. However, when the information revelation eect
of empowerment is also present, the defense may be able to identify some white jurors who are
preferred to some non-white jurors (and vice versa for the prosecutor). In this case, the interaction
of empowerment and defense attorney skill need not lead to a higher proportion of non-whites on
seated juries, and can, in fact, be associated with white jurors being retained at a very high rate.
Next, we test our theoretical predictions empirically, using a rich dataset on all non-capital
felony trials in four large and diverse counties over a two-year period. The dataset includes infor-
mation on the freedoms that were granted to attorneys during jury selection, on attorney skill, on
observable characteristics of jurors, on the self-reported pre-deliberation leanings of jurors, and on
numerous other characteristics of the trial and the parties involved.
The results of our empirical analysis are surprising. Attorney empowerment in jury selection,
other things equal, is associated with a concentration of jurors who report having greater favoritism
towards the defense prior to deliberations. This eect is almost entirely accounted for by trials in
which the defense attorney held a skill advantage. We interpret this result as conrmation of the
basic validity of our model.
However, neither skill nor empowerment nor their interaction is associated, in our data, with
any substantial impact on the average composition of seated juries by observable characteristics,
including, most notably, race. In the context of our model, this result implies that, for at least
some of the trials in our dataset, attorneys leveraged empowerment in voir dire to learn more about
potential jurors, rather than just to strike more eectively.
1.1 Related Literature and Our Contributions
Our paper connects two branches of related literature to which economists have contributed. The
rst comprises theoretical studies of attorney behavior in jury selection and potential impacts of
this behavior on verdicts. The second comprises empirical studies of the impacts of race and other
juror characteristics on trial outcomes.
There is a common and natural framework underlying much of the previous theoretical work.
The foundation is an assumption that potential jurors are drawn from a unidimensional distribution
of predispositions. Other things equal, the defense attorney will want to strike the potential jurors
with the strongest inclinations towards the prosecution, and the prosecuting attorney will likewise
want to strike the potential jurors with the strongest inclinations towards the defense.
Brams and Davis (1978) explore this framework from a game theoretic perspective, and char-
acterize attorney optimal responses when facing various constraints related to jury size, sequence
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of decisions, and number of strikes allowed.2 Neilson and Winter (2000) make use of the same
underlying framework to gauge the impact of allowing attorneys a greater number of strikes on
two types of injustice: false convictions and false acquittals.3 A common nding of this literature
is that the probability of a conviction will often be too high { relative either to a case in which
juries are chosen randomly or to a case in which the likelihood of injustice is minimized { unless
the defense attorney is allowed a greater number of strikes than the prosecuting attorney.
There have been several attempts to establish empirical evidence that certain observable juror
characteristics are associated with dierent trial outcomes. Anwar, Bayer and Hjalmarsson (2011)
nd that juries formed from all-white jury pools convict black defendants at a substantially and
statistically signicantly higher rate than they convict white defendants. Lee (2010) uses state
variation in the timing of jury reforms, and also nds that greater potential racial heterogeneity on
juries is associated with lower conviction rates of minority defendants. Lehmann and Smith (2011)
nd that juries with a larger proportion of blacks are less likely to convict regardless of the race of
the defendant, and that juries with lower average incomes are also less likely to convict. On the
other hand, Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002) nd little relation between jury racial composition and
the probability of a hung jury.4
This empirical literature establishes that attorneys who wish to maximize the probability of a
case being decided for their side should want to remove jurors on the basis of race and perhaps
other observable characteristics, at least in the absence of other useful information. However, it has
not satisfactorily explored how attorneys actually behave and what they accomplish in voir dire.5
The theoretical literature, on the other hand, has not incorporated empirical insights on juror race
comprehensively, and can be usefully extended in this and other ways. We pursue such extensions
theoretically, and we empirically conrm our model's predictions concerning what attorneys can
accomplish.
2Roth, Kadane and Degroot (1977), Degroot and Kadane (1980) and Kadane, Stone and Wallstrom (1999) provide
technical extensions on this theme.
3Kadane and Kairys (1979) design an algorithm to nd the optimal number of strikes allowed under a slightly
dierent denition of injustice. Ford (2010) examines the impact of varying the number of strikes allowed on conviction
rates in a similar framework, without reference to an explicit denition of injustice. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
consider the same types of injustice as Neilson and Winter (2000) in the context of strategic voting, but jurors in
that context are ex ante identical, so there is no scope to examine aspects of jury selection.
4Shayo and Zussman (2011), Alesina and La Ferrara (2011) and Abrams et al. (2011) provide evidence that the
race of judges, victims, and defendants can likewise aect the outcomes of non-jury trials. There are many other
studies on race and trial outcomes that rely on mock trials and case studies of a handful of trials at a time. A fairly
recent and comprehensive review of such studies is given by Sommers and Ellsworth (2003), and a more in-depth and
critical review of the earliest of these studies is given by Pfeifer (1990). Bowers et al. (2001) include 340 trials in their
analysis, but are unable to adequately control for heterogeneity across these trials. They nd that the death penalty
is three times as likely for a case with a black defendant whose victim is white and for which the jury consists of ve
or more white male jurors than for similar cases with more mixed juries.
5One potential exception is Diamond et al. (2009), who nd, in their sample of small claims civil suits, that
attorneys on both sides appeared to strike potential jurors largely on the basis of race, but that these strikes mostly
oset one another. The authors do not discuss the impact of jury composition on the outcomes of the trials.
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Our rst contribution relative to previous theoretical work is that we make more realistic as-
sumptions about the information available to attorneys. Brams and Davis (1978) assume that
attorneys can observe juror predispositions, while Nielson and Winter (2000) assume that attor-
neys cannot observe predispositions but know that an observable juror characteristic is predictive
of a stronger predisposition towards the prosecution. We assume instead that jurors are described
by a two-dimensional set of characteristics: one, such as race, which is always observable; and
a second, namely a predisposition to one side or the other, which can potentially be imperfectly
observed if attorneys are empowered. When attorneys cannot observe predispositions at all, they
have no choice but to rely on the common-knowledge correlation between the observable charac-
teristic and unobservable leanings. But when empowerment allows attorneys to learn about juror
inclinations, they can use this partial information in addition to the information already aorded
by the observable characteristic. Our model thus includes the Nielson and Winter framework as a
special case, while, in the general specication, avoiding the full-information assumption of Brams
and Davis.
Our second contribution relative to previous theoretical work is that we broaden our focus
beyond peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges allow attorneys to strike any potential juror
without stating a reason, with very few exceptions. In contrast, successful challenges for cause must
be accompanied by an acceptable argument that the targeted potential jurors have demonstrated an
inability to be impartial. Previous studies only treat attorney decisions concerning which potential
jurors to strike with a limited number of available peremptory challenges, assuming that all potential
jurors for whom an inability to be impartial could be demonstrated have been removed via challenges
for cause in an unmodeled earlier stage. Our modeling assumptions re
ect a more realistic situation
in which attorneys attempt to use both strikes for cause and peremptory strikes to remove jurors
with unfavorable predispositions to their side. The ability of attorneys in our model to remove
and object to the removal of potential jurors { and the eect of empowerment on this ability { is
handled in a reduced-form manner that can incorporate strikes made via either type of challenge.
Our third contribution is the inclusion of heterogeneity in attorney skill, which follows naturally
from these rst two. There is little potential role for attorney skill when juror predispositions
are fully observable and only peremptory challenges are considered. However, the acquisition
and interpretation of information, and persuasiveness in semantic arguments over what constitutes
grounds for dismissal for cause, can reasonably be expected to depend on attorney facility. We hence
allow for the possibility that more skilled attorneys can reap greater benets from empowerment
than less skilled attorneys in our model, and test for this possibility empirically.6
Our nal noteworthy contribution is the consideration of juror predispositions directly, rather
than trial verdicts. To be sure, the verdict is what all parties involved in the trial care about most.
6Abrams and Yoon (2007) and Shinall (2010) nd that attorney skill is an important determinant of trial outcomes,
but do not discuss this in the context of jury selection.
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However, verdicts are a product of more than the predispositions of individual jurors. Of specic
concern for our work is that verdicts are determined by jury deliberations, which can entail complex
group dynamics and decision-making. Previous theoretical contributions skirt this issue by calcu-
lating the jury's overall probability of conviction as the simple product of each juror's probability
of conviction, while noting the unsatisfactory nature of the implicit independence assumption. In-
stead, we take individual juror predispositions as the outcome variable of interest to attorneys.
We consider this to be a desirable approach based on our postulation that attorneys are much
better at assessing individual juror leanings than they are at predicting how the seated jurors will
interact with one another in arriving at their nal decision. Indeed, Gobert et al. (2009) suggest
that techniques available to attorneys for assessing individual jurors are much more advanced than
those for predicting deliberation dynamics, and that selecting \juries, not jurors" is still very much
an emerging concept.
This paper is the most complete attempt to date to measure what attorneys can actually accom-
plish, given varying degrees of empowerment in jury selection, in terms of multiple characteristics
of the seated jurors they manage to retain. We nd that skilled and empowered attorneys can
successfully retain jurors favorably inclined to their side on seated juries, but that they do not
necessarily accomplish this simply by striking according to juror race. In fact, the attorneys in
our sample end up altering the racial composition of the seated jury relative to the jury pool very
little: equivalent to no more than one juror of a given race in either direction on a twelve-person
jury. The implication is that empowerment in voir dire can allow attorneys to uncover valuable
information about jurors and therefore to avoid using racial stereotypes as a crutch.
We believe that our results could lead to more constructive policy advice than recommendations
that have been made to restrict attorney freedoms in jury selection. We will leave specic discussion
of policy implications for the conclusion, along with an attempt to address the important question
of how our results might generalize to regions that we have not been able to include in our empirical
analysis.
The paper will proceed as follows. The second section introduces the model and presents its
main results. The third section describes the dataset that we employ. The fourth section presents
and discusses the empirical ndings and a number of robustness checks. The nal section concludes
by discussing remaining challenges to be addressed and oering policy suggestions.
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2 A Model of Attorney Empowerment and Jury Selection
2.1 Voir Dire in Practice and in the Model
A very common organizational framework for voir dire employed in some variation in most American
criminal trials is known as the strike-and-replace method.7 Under this framework, the \panel" or
\venire" of potential jurors { which we can take as being approximately randomly drawn from the
county population { is rst randomly ordered. Sometimes the entire panel is initially examined
at this stage, and strikes for cause exercised. In either case, the rst several panelists from the
random order are provisionally seated and potentially examined in more depth. Once the attorneys
are satised that none of the provisionally seated jurors can be removed for cause, they exercise
peremptory challenges in some pre-determined alternating sequence, usually with the prosecutor
going rst. Those provisionally seated jurors who are thus excused are then replaced by the panelists
next in line. This cycle then repeats itself, sometimes with the restriction that seated jurors who
have already been \passed" on by both attorneys cannot be further examined or struck. The
process ends when there are twelve jurors in the box who both attorneys have passed on, or when
all peremptory challenges have been exhausted by both sides. In either case, the nal seated jury is
composed of the twelve jurors then seated, with the remaining venirepersons who have not already
been struck also sent home.
The examination of potential jurors can be carried out primarily by the judge, by the judge with
suggestions or a greater degree of participation from the attorneys, or primarily by the attorneys.
Attorneys may also have access to the results of questionnaires lled in by potential jurors: ei-
ther rudimentary surveys used by the court or, sometimes, \Supplementary Juror Questionnaires"
(SJQs) that the attorneys have designed. The judge has full discretion over the decisions of how
much attorney participation to allow and whether an SJQ is allowed. Individual judges tend to
have strong views on how these decisions should be made, and to hold adamantly to them.
The primary concerns that are examined in any voir dire are the existence of personal relation-
ships between panelists and any other parties involved in the trial, and the capacity to understand
and contemplate the salient legal issues and evidence in a dispassionate and impartial manner. But
many other subjects can also be explored, especially if attorneys have a high degree of participation.
As voir dire questioning proceeds, attorneys challenge for cause by arguing that the responses of a
given venireperson have revealed an inability to be impartial. The attorney on the opposite side is
permitted to object to this argument and raise counter-arguments, and the judge must ultimately
rule in favor of or against the strike. If the judge rules in favor of the strike, the potential juror is
dismissed. Attorneys can strike an unlimited number of potential jurors for cause, as long as the
7Our understanding of the voir dire process is based on Gobert et al. (2009) and Starr and McCormick (2001),
as well as informal interviews with a number of acquaintances in the legal profession. The discussion here will be
cursory, but a more detailed description is provided by Lehmann and Smith (2011).
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judge can be suciently convinced that disqualication has been demonstrated.
Attorneys also have a limited number of peremptory strikes at their disposal. These allow the
removal of potential jurors without the requirement that bias or any other deciency be demon-
strated. States and some counties provide guidelines on the number of peremptory challenges that
should be made available, but judges are under no obligation to follow these guidelines, and ex-
ceptions are often made for various reasons. Nonetheless, the total number of peremptory strikes
available is generally small relative to the size of the panel. There is also a chance that a peremptory
strike can be disallowed: if an attorney suspects that the motivation for a strike is discriminatory
in nature, a \Batson objection" can be raised. If the opposing attorney cannot respond by stating
a non-discriminatory justication for the strike, it will be disallowed.
We model a simplied strike-and-replace voir dire procedure. The panel is assumed to be
innite, with a composition across all venireperson characteristics xed and mirroring that of the
population.8 The panel is arranged according to a random ordering that attorneys do not observe,
and the single panelist at the top of this order is provisionally seated. If either attorney chooses to
strike this panelist and is successful, the panelist is dismissed, and the next panelist from the random
ordering is provisionally seated. This process continues until an attempted strike is unsuccessful
or neither attorney chooses to attempt a strike. At that time, the provisionally-seated panelist
becomes the sole member of the one-person seated jury that will hear the trial.9
There is a probability that any strike attempt will be successful, and we allow this probability
to dier by attorney and to depend on skill and empowerment. This is mostly meant to represent
strikes for cause. With a certain probability, the panelist under examination will exhibit some
traits that one of the attorneys can represent as demonstrating impartiality, at least to the point of
rebutting any objections raised by the opposing counsel and convincing the judge. Empowered and
skilled attorneys can better uncover such traits, and better argue over the semantics of how they
reveal impartiality. However, this framework can be slightly modied to incorporate peremptory
strikes too. First of all, peremptory strikes can have a less-than-perfect success rate due to Batson
objections. More generally, though, we could allow attorneys to have a much higher (or perfect)
success rate for a limited number of strikes. This is an extension that we consider worthwhile and
that we are currently pursuing. In the meantime, we propose that our present approach is capable
of providing most of the insights that the more general approach will.
We will proceed for the rest of this section within this simplied framework. After formalizing
some notation and concepts, the roles of attorney empowerment and skill will be claried. Our
8Courthouses can, in principle, bring in new panels for a given trial if the intially-drawn panel is exhausted by
strikes, though this is rarely necessary. However, there have been concerns raised that panel composition does not
accurately re
ect population characteristics due to insucient methods to construct and maintain master juror lists.
Neither of these issues is important for our analysis.
9The one-person jury model can be interpreted as a single round of decisions in a series of rounds in which attorneys
decide how to ll a 12-person jury one juror at a time, which is essentially the approach taken by Brams and Davis
(1978). The relaxation of this assumption, though cumbersome, is therefore straightforward.
8Attorney Empowerment and Jury Race Smith & Lehmann
main goal is to evaluate the probability that the seated juror will possess various attributes, and
characterize how this probability depends on attorney empowerment and skill.
2.2 Preliminaries
Suppose that an  2 (0;1) proportion of the panel is non-white and a 1    proportion is white.10
Each potential juror is described by two characteristics: his/her
1. race, i = fnon   white (n);white (w)g and
2. standard required to convict, s = fhigh (h);low (l)g.
Race is fully observable to both attorneys, but standards required to convict are not. We interpret
someone with a high standard required to convict { that is, someone requiring very strong evidence
against the defendant to vote guilty { as someone with a predisposition or inclination towards
the defense. We therefore refer to h-types as those with a predisposition towards the defense,
and l-types as those with a predisposition towards the prosecution. The defense attorney will
always prefer seating an h-type to seating an l-type on the jury, and vice versa for the prosecution.
pi 2 (0;1) is the proportion of jurors of race i who are predisposed to the defense (i.e. h-types), and
the remaining (1   pi) is the fraction who are predisposed towards the prosecution (i.e. l-types).
These proportions are common knowledge to both attorneys.
We assume that the proportion of h-types is greater among non-whites than whites:
Assumption 1 (Race and Predispositions).
pn > pw (1)
Hence, without any additional information about the panelists, the defense will always prefer a
non-white panelist over a white panelist, and the prosecution will always prefer to seat a white
venireperson rather than a non-white.
Given the proportion of non-whites/whites and the fraction of their predisposition types in the
potential juror population, we dene
p = pn + (1   )pw (2)
as the proportion of panelists with a predisposition towards the defense.
2.3 Roles of Attorney Empowerment and Skill
In voir dire, the judge may grant greater power to the attorneys, for example by allowing them to
participate to a greater degree in the examination of potential jurors or to use a Supplementary
10We will focus on race for simplicity of exposition, but note that all results hold for any observable characteristic.
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Juror Questionnaire. We assume that such greater power potentially allows attorneys to 1) nd
grounds to successfully strike any panelist with a higher probability than otherwise; and/or 2) to
acquire additional information about the predispositions of panelists and thus to better identify
potential jurors who are more favorably-inclined to their side. We will rst discuss the expected
racial composition and predispositions of the seated jury when attorneys are not empowered. We
will then analyze the impact of attorney empowerment on these aspects of the seated jury when
only the rst mechanism is operative; when both mechanisms are operative; and when only the
second mechanism is operative.
In our analysis, we allow the magnitude of both eects to depend on the relative skill levels
of the attorneys. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that the defense attorney is more highly
skilled than the prosecutor throughout our theoretical discussion. This is motivated by the fact that
it is common in criminal trials for the defense attorney to be more experienced than the prosecutor.
However, the model is symmetric from the perspective of each side, and our general conclusions
hold whether the defense or the prosecutor is more skilled.
2.4 No Attorney Empowerment
Let  be the baseline probability that a strike by either side is successful. We assume that greater
rhetorical skill is ineective without some information beyond that revealed by a rudimentary
judge-conducted examination of panelists. Thus, without empowerment, attorneys have no means
to improve this success rate, regardless of any skill advantage.
With probability , the rst potential juror to be provisionally seated will be non-white. The
prosecution will want to strike this panelist, since no information is available besides the panelist's
observable race and the a priori knowledge that non-whites are more likely to be predisposed to the
defense. With probability (1   ), the strike will be unsuccessful, and the non-white panelist will
become the seated juror. With probability , the strike will be successful, and the next panelist
in the random order will be provisionally seated. There is then a probability of (1   ) that
this panelist will be white. The same reasoning can be repeated in this case, except that it will
be the defense attorney who attempts to strike the provisionally-seated juror. It is clear from the
symmetry of the reasoning and the equality of striking success rates that attorneys will be powerless
to alter the probability that the seated juror will be non-white beyond the probability that any
randomly-drawn panelist is non-white, namely . It follows directly that the expected probability
that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense is just p.
Proposition 1. When attorneys are unempowered, regardless of attorney skill,
(i) the probability that the seated juror will be non-white is the same, and
(ii) the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense is also the same
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as if the jury were randomly drawn from the panel.
2.5 Empowerment Increases Striking Ability Only
Assume now that attorney empowerment allows attorneys to nd a broader basis for striking a
panelist, thereby increasing the probability that an attempted strike will be successful. Let p
be the prosecutor's striking success rate with attorney empowerment, and likewise, let d be the
defense attorney's striking success rate when attorneys are empowered, where both of these are
greater than the baseline striking success rate without empowerment. We further assume that the
eect of empowerment on striking success is greater for the more highly skilled attorney, because
attorneys with a greater rhetorical facility will be better able to support their claims of juror
impartiality in the face of objections from their opponents. This assumption also allows for greater
attorney skill to improve the chance of blocking an opponent's attempted strikes through more
convincing counter-arguments. Since, as was discussed above, we are treating the defense attorney
as the more highly skilled attorney for the sake of exposition, this implies that d > p. Combining
these assumptions, we have:
Assumption 2 (Empowerment and Striking Ability).
0 <  < p < d < 1 (3)
The voir dire proceeds as follows. Each attorney decides whether to strike the panelist at the
top of the random order or not. If the panelist is not struck or an attempted strike fails, then the
panelist will be seated. If the panelist is struck successfully, he/she is replaced by the next individual
from the top of the randomly-ordered venire, and the attorneys decide to attempt a strike or not
(and argue over the basis for the strike). The process continues until a juror is successfully seated.
Let V be the probability that the panelist who is eventually seated is non-white. Additionally,
let Vn be the probability that the seated juror will be non-white if a non-white panelist is at the
head of the queue. Vw is, then, the probability that the seated juror will be non-white if a white
panelist is the head of the queue. Our assumption that the panel is of innite size ensures that the
identity of the juror at the head of the queue does not change the composition of the remaining
panel.
With no additional information about the predispositions of the potential jurors aside from
race, the defense (prosecuting) attorney will always try to strike when a white (non-white) panelist
is at the head of the queue. Let's rst consider the case in which a non-white panelist is at the head
of the queue. With probability (1 p), the panelist will survive the prosecutor's strike request and
end up as the seated juror. With probability p, he/she will be successfully struck and replaced by
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a random panelist at the head of the queue. Therefore, Vn can be dened as
Vn = (1   p) + pV: (4)
Similarly, when a white is at the head of the queue, he/she will survive the defense attorney's
strike with probability (1 d), or with probability d, will be struck and be replaced by a random
panelist at the head of the queue. Vw is then
Vw = dV: (5)
The overall expected probability that the panelist who is eventually seated is non-white is a weighted
average of Vn and Vw, with weights given by the probability that a non-white will be at the head
of the queue, , versus a white, (1   ):
V = Vn + (1   )Vw: (6)
This probability is then dened completely by the system of three equations (4), (5), and (6).
Solving this system yields
V =
(1   p)
(1   d) + (d   p)
: (7)
It is trivial to show from (7) that V >  as long as d > p, which holds by Assumption 2.
It is also intuitive and can be easily shown that the probability that the seated juror is predis-
posed to the defense { which we call U { is higher than that in the panel, p. This probability is
dened as
U = pnV + pw(1   V ); (8)
which, after substitution of (7) for V , yields
U =
(1   p)pn + (1   )(1   d)pw
(1   d) + (d   p)
: (9)
It can be shown that U > p as long as d > p and pn > pw, which hold directly by Assumptions
1 and 2.
These results on the race and predisposition of the seated juror are intuitive. When empow-
erment increases striking ability only, the attorneys are simply able to more successfully strike on
the basis of their a priori racial preferences; and when the defense attorney has a skill advantage,
the defense is relatively more successful at striking than the prosecution, and so the outcome will
more frequently benet the defense attorney on net.
Proposition 2. When empowerment only increases attorney striking ability, and the defense is
more skilled,
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(i) the probability that the seated juror will be non-white is higher, and
(ii) the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense is also higher
than if the jury were randomly drawn from the panel.
2.6 Empowerment Increases Striking Ability and Provides Information on Ju-
ror Predispositions
Now suppose that empowerment not only increases the striking ability of the attorneys, but also
allows attorneys to acquire additional information about the panelist and to better identify panelists
who are favorably-inclined to their side.
We assume that, when empowered, attorneys observe a dichotomous signal  2 fHigh(H);Low(L)g
correlated with the panelists' predispositions. For simplicity, we assume that only the more skillful
attorney of the two sides is able to observe .11 A panelist of type s exhibits H with probability
s and exhibits L with probability 1   s. We assume that the 's are independent of race and
that h > l, so that any h-type panelist has a higher probability of exhibiting H than any l-type
panelist. The probability that a panelist of race i exhibits H is then

i = pih + (1   pi)l; (10)
and, under our parameters assumptions about pi and h, we know that 
n > 
w. We can also
express the conditional posterior probability that a juror of race i exhibiting H is actually an
h-type as
iH = Pr[s = hji; = H] =
pih
pih + (1   pi)l
: (11)
Similarly, the conditional posterior probability that a juror of race i and signal  = L is actually
an h-type is
iL = Pr[s = hji; = L] =
pi(1   h)
pi(1   h) + (1   pi)(1   l)
: (12)
Because the less-skilled prosecutor does not see , his strategy in voir dire remains the same
as before. That is, the prosecutor will try to strike non-white panelists and will attempt to block
the striking of white panelists by the defense.12 However, the defense attorney, now having seen ,
11One could also assume that both attorneys observe , but that the more skillful attorney can observe the signal
more accurately. This alternative assumption, while more realistic, has not been employed here because it complicates
the model without providing additional insight.
12In fact, we implicitly make a rather stronger set of assumptions about the skill-disadvantaged attorney in order
to ensure that this behavior arises. In addition to not allowing the prosecutor to see the signal, we also assume that
the prosecutor is unable to learn anything by observing the striking behavior of the defense attorney, or otherwise
condition his own striking behavior on the anticipated or actual striking behavior of the defense attorney. The
prosecutor thus behaves as though fully unaware of the potential existence of any signal. Allowing the less-skilled
attorney to instead observe a less precise signal necessitates the relaxation of this package of assumptions, which can
give rise to some anomalous cases.
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updates her race-based a priori belief about any panelist's predisposition with information revealed
by , according to (11) and (12).
Note that, given our our assumptions that pn > pw and h > l, a non-white panelist exhibiting
H has the highest probability of being an h-type (nH), while a white panelist exhibiting L has the
lowest probability of being an h-type (wL). However, it remains unclear whether wH > nL. This
inequality will hold only if and only if the following condition is met.











This condition states that the odds ratio of exhibiting the signal H between h-types and l-
types is greater than the odds ratio of being an h-type between non-whites and whites. Intuitively,
wH > nL { so that the defense attorney will prefer some white panelists to some non-white
panelists { if and only if the signal  is suciently more informative about juror predispositions
than race alone.
2.6.1 Defense Attorney's Reservation Striking Threshold
When empowerment enables the defense attorney to better identify panelists predisposed to the
defense, the defense and prosecuting attorneys can now potentially \agree" on their preference to
strike or to seat a panelist.13 We, therefore, slightly modify our assumptions on empowerment's
eect on attorneys' striking abilities by assuming that 1) if neither attorney wants to strike the
panelist at the head of the queue, that individual will be seated on the jury; and 2) if both attorneys
want to strike a panelist, that panelist will be struck with probability 1. If the prosecution and the
defense disagree, then the probabilities of successful strikes are dened by p and d, respectively,
as before.
Given the primitive parameters of the model and the informativeness of , the defense attorney
will take the static behavior of the prosecutor as given, and choose her own striking behavior to
maximize the expected probability that the seated juror will be predisposed to the defense. The
defense attorney's strategy can be represented as the choice of a reservation threshold R such that
she will attempt to strike a panelist if i < R and argue against any attempted strikes otherwise.




where U() is the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense and is
13For example, the prosecution will always want to seat a white panelist, as before. However, now the defense may
want to seat a white panelist if her posterior belief that the panelist is an h-type is suciently high.
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dened implicitly by the following system of ve equations:
UnH() = (1   p)nH + pU() (15)
UwL() = (1   d)wL + dU() (16)
UnL() =
(





wH if wH  
(1   d)wH + dU() otherwise
(18)
U() = 
nUnH() + (1   
n)UnL() + (1   )
wUwH() + (1   )(1   
w)UwL(): (19)
The structure of equations (15) to (19) can be explained as follows. Since, as was mentioned
above, a non-white exhibiting H has the highest probability of being predisposed to the defense
and a white exhibiting L has the lowest, it is always optimal for the defense attorney to try to
argue against attempted strikes of a non-white H and to attempt to strike a white L. The less-
skilled prosecutor will always want to strike any non-white and argue against attempted strikes of
any white, as explained above, and the defense attorney anticipates this fully. These choices are
re
ected in equations (15) and (16) dening UnH { the expected probability that the seated juror
will be predisposed to the defense when a non-white exhibiting H is at the head of the queue {
and UwL { the corresponding probability when a white exhibiting L is at the top of the order {
respectively.
The probabilities that the seated juror will be an h-type when a non-white exhibiting L or a
white exhibiting H is at the head of the queue depend on the threshold  relative to the i's. For
example, if a white exhibiting signal H is at the head of the queue, wH   represents a case in
which neither the defense nor the prosecution attempt to strike him. Then the expected probability
that the seated juror will be an h-type when a white exhibiting H is at the head of the queue in
(18) is exactly equal to wH, since he will be seated with probability 1 given our assumptions about
attorney striking success. However, if wH < , this represents a case in which the defense attempts
to strike, and the panelist will hence only be seated with probability (1   d), or will be replaced
by a random panelist with probability d.
Finally, the overall expected probability that a seated juror will be predisposed towards the
defense, U, for a given threshold , is a weighted average of (15) through (18), with weights given
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by the population proportions of the four i groups. There will in general be a range for  over
which U is maximized; we do not need to characterize R more precisely than noting that it belongs
to this range. This probability is hence maximized when the defense attorney follows the strategy
of attempting to strike any panelist with i < R and arguing against any attempted strikes
otherwise.
2.6.2 Race and Predisposition of the Seated Juror
We will limit our discussion to two key cases regarding the striking behavior of the defense attorney
and the strength of the signal.
Case 1: nH > nL > R > wH > wL
In this case, Condition 1 does not hold, so that the information revealed by the signal is not
enough to overcome the defense attorney's a priori preference for non-whites. Further, non-whites
represent a large enough fraction of the population and are likely enough to be predisposed to the
defense that the defense attorney chooses to set her reservation threshold R above wH. The net
result is that the defense attorney will attempt to strike any white panelist, regardless of , and
will object to attempts by the prosecutor to strike any non-white panelists, again regardless of
. Therefore, this case is eectively the same as when empowerment only increased the striking
abilities of the attorneys. The probability that the seated juror will be non-white is higher than if a
randomly selected juror were seated, as is the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed
towards the defense.
Case 2: nH > wH > R > nL > wL
A more interesting case is when Condition 1 is met, so that the defense attorney is able to
identify some white panelists with a higher probability, conditional on the signal, of being predis-
posed to the defense than some non-white panelists. Furthermore, assume that the fraction of the
population exhibiting signal H is moderate enough that it is optimal for the defense attorney to
set her reservation striking threshold R above nL. Thus, the defense attorney will argue against
the prosecutor's attempted strikes of non-white panelists exhibiting H, as usual; but will herself
attempt to strike non-white panelists exhibiting L, joining in with the prosecutor's eorts in this
regard. Furthermore, the defense attorney will not attempt to strike any white panelists exhibiting
H, and since the prosecutor will never attempt to strike any white panelist, a white panelist ex-
hibiting H that is at the top of the random order of panelists will become the seated juror without
objection from either side. Therefore, in this case, V , the expected probability that the panelist
who eventually becomes the seated juror will be non-white, is dened by the following system of
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equations:





nVnH + (1   
n)VnL + (1   )
wVwH + (1   )(1   
w)VwL:




1   [1   
n(1   p)]   (1   )[(1   
w)d]
: (20)
It can be shown that V <  always, as long as Condition 1 and our basic parameter assumptions
hold.14 Therefore, the probability that the seated juror will be non-white is less in this case than
if the jury were chosen randomly.
However, as in previous cases, U, the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed
towards the defense, is higher than in the panel overall. The most straightforward way to calculate
U is to use the specic form of equations (15) through (19) for this case, which is
UnH = (1   p)nH + pU
UnL = U
UwH = wH
UwL = (1   d)wL + dU
U = 
nUnH + (1   
n)UnL + (1   )
wUwH + (1   )(1   
w)UwL:
(21)
Solving for U yields
U =

n(1   p)nH + (1   )
wwH + (1   )(1   
w)(1   d)wL
1   [1   
n(1   p)]   (1   )[(1   
w)d]
(22)
where it can be shown that U > p under our parameter assumptions.15
14The demonstration of this claim is tedious, as the expression involves all of the parameters of the model through
the denition of 
i in equation (10). It is more straightforward to show a sucient but not necessary condition in
terms of the striking success rates of each attorney. This sucient condition is d > pn=pw  (1   p). Intuitively,
this condition is saying that it must be suciently more likely that the defense attorney successfully strikes a white
panelist exhibiting L (hence obtaining another draw from the panel) than it is for the prosecutor to fail to strike
a non-white panelist exhibiting H (which would result in the voir dire terminating with a non-white seated juror).
This condition is fairly stringent for many parameter values. However, as noted, the only necessary conditions are
the baseline parameter assumptions we have made.
15Again, this claim is tedious to demonstrate algebraically. However, it is clear that it must hold, since this is the
objective that the defense attorney is attempting to maximize. If U were less than p, the defense attorney would
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In Case 2, we have thus shown an example for which empowerment (which increases attorney
striking abilities and allows them to more precisely identify juror predispositions in this case) leads
to a lower probability that the seated juror will be non-white, compared to the proportion of non-
whites in the population.
Other Cases
Cases 1 and 2 are the most extreme of the many possible cases. Others are nonetheless inter-
esting. When the proportion of the panel exhibiting the High signal is small, the defense attorney
may choose to refrain from striking all but white panelists exhibiting L, achieving a probability
that the seated juror is non-white slightly greater than . On the other hand, when this proportion
is large, the defense attorney may wish to attempt to strike all but non-white panelists exhibiting
H; depending on the specic value of h, the probability that the seated juror is non-white can be
slightly less than or slightly greater than . We will avoid a detailed exposition of these cases for
the present, as Cases 1 and 2 are sucient to support the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. When empowerment increases attorney striking ability and allows attorneys to
better identify panelists' predispositions, and the defense attorney is more skilled,
(i) the probability that the seated juror will be non-white may be higher or lower, yet
(ii) the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense is always higher
than if the juror were randomly drawn from the panel.
2.7 Empowerment Provides Information on Juror Predispositions Only
For completeness, we can also consider the set of cases for which only the second eect of empow-
erment is present. Specically, assume now that empowerment does not increase attorney striking
ability, but does allow the more skilled attorney to more accurately identify juror inclinations.
Mechanically, this just involves setting p = d =  in equations (15) to (19) and repeating the
analysis of the previous section.16 We proceed here with an intuitive discussion of the salient results,
without revisiting the formal analysis.
In all cases, the probability that the seated juror will be non-white is less than the population
proportion non-white. Whenever the attorneys dier in their desire to strike a panelist, the pan-
elist will be struck successfully with probability  on net. The attorneys always disagree on white
panelists exhibiting L and on non-white panelists exhibiting H. However, the attorneys can poten-
tially agree on the two intermediate groups, depending on the quality of the signal and the defense
change striking behavior { for example, to that of Case 1 above { and be able to obtain a dierent U greater than p.
16We retain the assumption that the attorneys have a perfect striking success rate when they would both attempt
to strike a panelist, and a perfect success rate at seating a panelist whom neither of them attempts to strike.
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attorney's reservation striking threshold. The result is either that white panelists exhibiting H will
be struck with probability zero (rather than ); non-white panelists exhibiting L will be struck
with probability one (rather than ); or both.17 The net eect of any of these, in combination with
the xed and common probability of a panelist from the extreme groups being struck, is to reduce
the probability that a white panelist will be struck relative to that of a non-white panelist being
struck. The probability that the seated juror will be predisposed to the defense must always be at
least p, since the skilled defense attorney can always replicate the outcome that would arise if there
were no empowerment by disregarding the information obtained through empowerment.18 Thus,
we have our nal proposition.
Proposition 4. When empowerment only allows attorneys to better identify panelists' predisposi-
tions, and the defense attorney is more skilled,
(i) the probability that the seated juror will be non-white is lower, and
(ii) the probability that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense is higher
than if the juror were randomly drawn from the panel.
2.8 Summary
Comparing Propositions 2 through 4 to Proposition 1, the model produces a clear and intuitive
testable implication. When the defense attorney is relatively more skilled than the prosecutor,
attorney empowerment in voir dire is associated with an increase in the probability that the seated
juror will be predisposed to the defense. Predictions concerning the race of the seated juror are
less clear. If the nature of attorney empowerment is only such that it improves the striking ability
of attorneys, empowerment will be associated with an increase in the probability that the seated
juror will be non-white. In direct contrast, if the nature of attorney empowerment is only such
that it allows attorneys to learn more about juror predispositions, empowerment will be associated
with a decrease in the probability that the seated juror will be non-white. And, therefore, if both
mechanisms are operative, empowerment could be associated with either an increase or a decrease
in the probability that the seated juror will be non-white. Since the precise nature of attorney
17The less skilled prosecutor does not observe the signal, as per our assumption stated earlier, but rather \agrees"
with the defense attorney in these cases by virtue of his usual strategy of only attempting to strike non-whites.
18For the case in which Condition 1 does not hold and the defense attorney's reservation striking threshold is
greater than wH but less than nL, the results collapse to those when attorneys are unempowered. The defense
attorney will attempt to strike any white panelist (and argue against attempted strikes by the prosecutor of any
non-white panelist), regardless of the signals exhibited by the panelists. The probability that any given panelist
will be successfully struck is , and therefore, the probability that the seated juror will be non-white is  and the
probability that the seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense is p. We consider this as somewhat of a
degenerate case: empowerment only provides information, but so little information that it is as though attorneys
are not empowered at all. We therefore group this case together with the baseline case in which attorneys are not
empowered.
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empowerment and of any information uncovered by attorneys in voir dire will be unobserved to
us in our empirical analysis, we will not be able to test these predictions concerning race directly.
Instead, our approach will be to attempt to draw inferences about the nature of empowerment from
our results. Before presenting these results, we will describe our dataset.
3 The NCSC/ICPSR Hung Juries Dataset
Our empirical analysis relies on a detailed examination of 351 felony jury trials in four major county
courts across the U.S. collected by Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002, 2003) for the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) during 2000 and 2001 and disseminated by the Interuniversity Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Although the NCSC's main goal in the study was to
provide an empirical evaluation of hung juries, the dataset is not limited to those trials ending in
a hung jury, and indeed includes all felony trials held in these courts during the specied period of
data collection.19 The four courts { Los Angeles County Superior Court in California, Maricopa
County Superior Court in Arizona, Bronx County Supreme Court in New York, and District of
Columbia Superior Court in Washington, D.C. { were chosen based on their high volume of felony
jury trials and their willingness to cooperate with the data collection process and guidelines. These
are all state trial courts of general jurisdiction and rst instance (as opposed to appellate courts).
Each court is fairly evenly represented in the dataset, with a single location accounting for about
85 trials each.20
The NCSC study provides a comprehensive look at the trial and all the parties involved: the
defendant(s) and the victim(s) (if any), the judge, the attorneys, and, most importantly for our
analysis, the seated jurors. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the initial jury pool
from which the seated jury was formed, except for the initial panel size.21
The case data in the NCSC study provide researchers with an extensive look at all the charges,
the race and sex of the defendant(s) and victim(s), and the voir dire process that led to the seated
jury. The NCSC questionnaires also asked the presiding judge of each trial his/her evaluation of
the evidence, case complexity, attorney skills, and the likely verdict. The attorneys in each trial
were asked about several of the same trial aspects, and about their legal experience and basic
demographic information, including sex and age. The juror questionnaire provides a rich set of
demographic information about each seated juror, including age, sex, race, education, income, and
religious beliefs. The NCSC data also contain a description of the dynamics of each juror's opinion
formation, and of pre- and post-deliberation perceptions and opinions regarding the defendant(s)
19The period of data collection varied by county, ranging from 4 to 11 months.
20D.C. has a slightly larger representation, with about 97 cases.
21We can, however, infer the average characteristics of the panel from those of the county as a whole, since a
panel is essentially a random sample of the county population. We include county xed eects in all of our empirical
specications, in part to account for the composition of the panel as much as possible.
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and victim(s). To our knowledge, the richness of the jury demographic and opinion information
available in the NCSC study is unmatched by any other readily available dataset.
Regrettably, although the NCSC dataset contains information on 351 cases and 3,497 jurors in
total, not every individual in our data answered every survey question. In our main specications,
which use responses from the case, judge, and juror modules of the dataset, we have data on
1,846 jurors across 251 trials. The attorney module has the lowest response rate, and in some
specications with attorney controls we have as few as 152 trials represented.
All data were collected condentially, and no information was made available to any of the trial
participants during the trial or during any subsequent appeals.22
3.1 Variables of Interest
Before presenting summary statistics, we will give a detailed discussion of the empirical analogues
we propose for some of the important theoretical variables from the model.
3.1.1 Juror Predispositions
Each juror was asked \Before you began deliberating with your fellow jurors at the end of the
trial (after all of the evidence and the judge's instructions had been presented), which side did you
favor?", which was answered on a scale of 1 (\Strongly favored the prosecution") to 7 (\Strongly
favored the defense"). We interpret higher responses on this seven-point scale as manifesting greater
doubts on the part of a juror that sucient incriminating evidence had been presented in relation
to that juror's personal (and otherwise unobservable) standard required to convict. Thus, jurors
with higher responses to this question are assumed to have entered deliberations with a general
mindset more inclined towards the defense.
We believe that this variable closely resembles the concept of juror predispositions as it was
conceived and employed in the construction of the model, and in addition that it is a reasonable
objective that attorneys would want to target in practice. The wording of the question can encom-
pass subtle juror leanings deriving potentially from common life experiences with the defendant,
the resonance of certain pieces of evidence and argument, and so on. These are things that attor-
neys could conceivably foresee in jury selection and shape arguments to further cultivate during
the trial.
Jurors were also asked their general opinions of the defendant and any victims outside the
context of the facts of the case, as well as a series of questions concerning the evolution of their
opinions during and after deliberations. We feel that these questions are less accurate represen-
tations both of our notion of juror predispositions and of traits that attorneys realistically target.
22These were conditions of the data collection agreements. We do not observe if any of the trials in the dataset
have since been retried or heard by an appeals court. Further details on the NCSC study and dataset are discussed
by Lehmann and Smith (2011).
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Jurors could very likely nd the defendant sincere and the victim untrustworthy and less believable,
yet still lean towards believing the defendant guilty. Furthermore, attorney manuals have only very
recently begun to espouse the idea that attorneys should \select juries, not jurors," and are more
likely to advise that deliberations are akin to a black box, so that that the surer route to success
is to focus on individual jurors during jury selection, rather than attempt to predict deliberation
dynamics. This traditional view goes back to Clarence Darrow, who is said to have remarked that
the outcome of a trial has virtually been decided by the time the jury has been sworn in.
All juror questionnaires were distributed at the conclusion of the trial. There is therefore
a potential concern that this question on the side favored prior to deliberation is an inaccurate
representation of jurors' actual states of mind at that time. For example, if the nal verdict was
the most salient memory for jurors at the conclusion of the trial, it is possible that they engaged
subconsciously in ex post rationalization in answering questions regarding earlier stages. We have
not been able to satisfactorily diagnose this possibility in the data. However, we nd reassurance
in the general care taken by the survey designers, and in the fact that this section of the survey
was carefully and transparently constructed to elicit information on the sequential nature of the
opinion formation of jurors over the entire trial and deliberations. For example, the survey includes
several reminders to respondents to consider precise times that they changed their minds.
3.1.2 Attorney Empowerment
The main case data contains an indicator for whether the voir dire was conducted by the judge alone,
the judge with questions suggested by attorneys, the judge and attorneys together, or primarily
attorneys. We combine the rst two and the latter two categories to form a dummy variable for
whether attorneys had high participation or low participation.23
The main case data also contains a dummy variable for whether or not there was a Supplemental
Juror Questionnaire used by the attorneys.24 However, there is no other information available
concerning SJQs. For example, we do not observe if it was requested by one side or the other if
present; we do not know if a request was made and denied if not present; we do not observe if both
sides had access to the responses if present; and we do not observe any of the specic information
that it contained if present.
Two important points should be mentioned concerning these two variables. First, it is implic-
itly assumed that each side is equally empowered by either instrument (high participation or a
questionnaire) in terms of the additional information about jurors that the defense and prosecut-
23For all 345 trials for which a response to this question is available, only six had voir dire conducted primarily by
attorneys, and only 36 had questions submitted by attorneys. Anecdotal evidence suggests that questions submitted
by attorneys are often ignored by judges.
24To reiterate, the survey instrument is in no way related to whatever SJQs may or may not have been used in
any trials, and the attorneys did not have access to any of the information from the survey instrument at any stage
of the trial.
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ing attorneys can obtain with them. This is in line with the assumptions of our model. There
is no information available concerning which attorney was more active in questioning or how any
SJQs were used, so there does not appear to be any feasible alternative to making this uniformity
assumption. As in the model, however, attorney skill will be examined as a way of identifying
heterogeneity across sides in the use that was made of these freedoms when they were available.
Second, it seems plausible to assume that the presence (or lack thereof) of these attorney free-
doms is exogenous to other aspects of the trial. Individual judges have wide latitude in determining
how the jury selection process is conducted, and most judges strictly adhere to a set of personal
preferences, especially in regard to the degree of participation aorded to attorneys in questioning
potential jurors. Judges can occasionally be persuaded to change policies if an attorney on either
side is suciently aware of the judge's usual policies and submits a motion for a more extensive
process than is typically allowed. This seems to be very rare in the case of attorney participation,
but perhaps not unheard of in the case of supplementary questionnaires.
Without this exogeneity, our estimation would suer a severe shortcoming. If, for example,
judges always allowed high attorney participation in trials for crimes that had received extensive
negative media attention, high participation could be highly correlated with jurors leaning away
from the defense (based in part on preconceived notions of the trial that the voir dire did not
successfully weed out). But this correlation would be driven by the fact that both high participation
and unfavorable opinions of the defendant are associated with the (unobserved in the dataset)
media attention. If there were some degree of endogeneity of this sort (for example, if, for some
trials, a questionnaire were allowed based on the motions of a defense attorney desiring as much
information as possible on a venire of potential jurors suspected of holding extreme prejudices
against the defendant), the estimated eects of attorney empowerment on juror predispositions
would be biased in a negative direction.
For most of our specications, we use a single dummy variable for whether or not attorneys
were empowered in voir dire. We construct this variable to take a value of 1 either if attorneys had
high participation or if there was an SJQ in use, and to take a value of 0 if attorneys had neither
freedom. However, we will also explore the robustness of our results to alternative denitions of
attorney empowerment.25
The dataset also contains additional information about the voir dire process. We observe the
number of peremptory challenges actually exercised by each side, but not how many were available
nor how this was determined. We also observe the total number of strikes for cause, but not
how many suggested strikes for cause were objected to or denied. There is a dummy variable
25Two small idiosyncracies of the dataset should be mentioned brie
y. All of the trials taking place in Bronx
County in the dataset had high attorney participation in questioning. On the other hand, none of the trials in the
dataset taking place in Maricopa had a questionnaire available. All of our specications control for the county in
which the trial took place, and we do not otherwise foresee these issues presenting problems within our empirical
strategy, which is more focused on the interaction of attorney skill and empowerment.
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indicating whether any Batson objections were raised during voir dire, but if there were, we do
not observe how many there were, which side raised them, whether they resulted in the nding of
any actual violation, or what remedies were imposed, if any. There is also a dummy variable for
whether the jury was anonymous, but there is no indication of whether this anonymity was from
the perspective of record-keeping only or if the jury was literally empaneled in a separate room
and voir dire conducted remotely. We observe the length of time voir dire took in hours, but not
whether there was a time limit in place. Finally, we observe the total size of the initial panel. We
have concerns about the completeness of the information furnished by these variables and about
their exogeneity, but we do make use of them in some specications.
3.1.3 Attorney Skill
The judge and each juror were asked separate questions of the form \How skillful was the [prosecu-
tor/defense attorney] during the trial?", which were answered on a scale of 1 (\Not at all skillful")
to 7 (\Very skillful").26
In the reductionist spirit of the model, we would like to have an indicator for which attorney
was the relatively more skilled. It would seem uncontroversial to assume that the judge would
provide the most objective assessment of attorney skill, so that an attractive option would be to
construct a dummy variable for whether or not the judge gave one attorney a higher skill rating
than the other. Unfortunately, the judge assigned the same skill rating to both attorneys in about
half the cases.
We have therefore decided to construct a hybrid skill indicator for each attorney by calculating
an average of the judge's rating on the one hand, and an average juror rating on the other hand.
We then calculate a relative skill index by subtracting the hybrid skill rating for the prosecutor
from the hybrid skill rating for the defense attorney. Finally, we construct a dummy variable that
we refer to as `Defense More Skilled' that takes a value of 1 when this relative skill index is greater
than zero.
We are aware of the arbitrary nature and potential shortcomings of this measure of relative
attorney skill. As we will discuss below, we do check for correlations between our relative skill
index and the few objective indicators of attorney experience that we observe (namely years in
legal practice, previous criminal trial experience, and age). We have smaller samples for this
purpose due to the lower attorney response rates, but we nd some reassuring results. We will also
discuss a number of robustness checks we have attempted.
A conceptual shortcoming of any of these skill measures is that they refer to skill in the trial
arena as a whole, whereas, it could be argued, our model suggests that we should be focusing on
26Attorneys were also asked similar questions about their own and their opponent's skill. We do not make use of
these variables due to concerns about subjectivity and for the pragmatic reason, as mentioned earlier, that attorneys
had the lowest response rates.
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attorney skill in voir dire exclusively. We respond to this, rst of all, by noting that skill in various
aspects of litigation are likely to be highly correlated, so that one lawyer displaying more skill
than another during a trial as a whole should be a good proxy for that same lawyer having shown
superior skill in any individual stage of the trial. However, the more important point is that we do
not necessarily want to disregard the possibility that attorney skill in argument and presentation
of evidence could aect individual juror predispositions, nor that attorneys could anticipate this
during jury selection. This is neither ruled out by a more general interpretation of our theoretical
framework nor by our empirical measurement of predispositions discussed above.
3.1.4 Other Variables
An important control variable in our analysis is the objective strength of evidence. For each trial,
the judge was asked how close the case was based on the evidence that had been presented. The
question was required to be answered on a scale of 1 (\Evidence strongly favored prosecution")
to 7 (\Evidence strongly favored defense"). Two dummy variables have been created from this
variable. The rst represents evidence strongly favoring the defense, and corresponds to responses
of 6 or 7 (versus responses of 1 through 5). The second represents evidence strongly favoring the
prosecution, and corresponds to responses of 1 or 2 (versus responses of 3 through 7). The overall
excluded category therefore corresponds to a close trial in terms of the evidence favoring neither
side very strongly.27
For juror race, we focus on the broad white/non-white dichotomous distinction that we used to
illustrate the model. We recognize that the more specic black/white distinction typically receives
the greatest focus in discussions of public policy, but the more salient dierence across our dataset
as a whole is the broader one. The non-white category is predictably heterogeneous across the four
counties, but the constituent members in each case are, in general, assumed by commentators and
legal practitioners to hold greater sympathies for defendants than their white counterparts.
Other juror-level characteristics we can observe include education, income, age, gender, and
religiousness. These are encoded categorically in the dataset, and we have converted them to
dummy variables in some cases and continuous variables in other cases.28
As has been mentioned before, we include county-level xed eects in all of our specications.
We can also control for some other trial-level variates. The dataset provides a fairly detailed
breakdown of trials by type of charge, which we coarsen into broad headings of violent, property
and drug crimes. We can also control for defendant race and for the race and gender of any victims
if present.29 Finally, we can control for whether or not the defendant had counsel provided at no
27We could be more 
exible by treating all seven categories distinctly. As this approach does not aect our restults,
we have chosen to retain the more parsimonious treatment.
28See Lehmann and Smith (2011) for additional details.
29We can also observe the defendant's gender, but we do not control for this because less than 10% of trials in the
dataset had a female defendant. A handful of trials in our estimation samples have multiple defendants, but always
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. N
Juror Predisposition (1 (pros.) - 7 (def.)) 3.517 2.064 1846 (jurors)
Juror Non-White 0.520 0.500 1846
Bronx 0.842 0.365 310
LA 0.631 0.483 472
DC 0.507 0.500 609
Maricopa 0.202 0.402 455
High Participation 0.622 0.486 251 (trials)
Questionnaire 0.203 0.403 251
Either 0.685 0.465 251
Both 0.139 0.347 251
Defense Skill (judge; 1-7) 5.104 1.438 251
Defense Skill (juror average; 1-7) 4.418 1.134 251
Pros. Skill (judge; 1-7) 4.873 1.541 251
Pros Skill (juror average; 1-7) 5.203 1.111 251
Defense More Skilled (0-1) 0.450 0.499 251
Source: Authors' tabulations from the NCSC/ICPSR Hung Juries Dataset (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2003).
cost, which we interpret as a rough indicator of the defendant's nancial means.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents selected summary statistics for our dataset. The sample means are calculated for
the observations that will be used in our main empirical specications.
On average, jurors in our sample were mildly predisposed towards the prosecution prior to
deliberations (comparing the mean response of 3.5 to the midpoint of 4 on the seven-point scale,
with 7 representing \Strongly favored the defense"). However, individual responses are dispersed
widely around this sample mean, and there was wide variation within many trials as well.
Slightly more than half of the seated jurors in our sample are non-white. This ranges from
84% in the Bronx to 20% in Maricopa. These dierences across counties in the racial composition
of seated juries largely correspond with the dierent racial compositions of the populations of
these counties. The non-white category is primarily composed of blacks in D.C. and Hispanics in
Maricopa, with both groups accounting for a large share in the Bronx and Los Angeles.
For nearly two thirds of the trials in our sample, attorneys enjoyed high participation in voir
dire. This includes all of the trials in the Bronx, compared to 27% of trials in Los Angeles and
about 60% of trials in D.C. and Maricopa. Supplemental Juror Questionnaires were available much
less frequently (20% of trials), and were never available in Maricopa. Just over two thirds of the
of the same race.
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trials in our sample granted either privilege to attorneys, which is our main indicator of attorney
empowerment.
Judges tended to give defense attorneys slightly higher skill ratings than prosecutors on average,
while the average of juror ratings for the prosecutor for a given trial exceeded that for the defense
attorney on average across the trials in our sample. Our main indicator of relative attorney skill
suggests that the defense attorney had a relative skill advantage over the prosecutor in 45% of
trials.30
4 Empirical Results
As has been discussed in detail, our theoretical model yields two predictions. The rst is straight-
forward: when attorneys are empowered and the defense attorney is relatively more skilled, seated
jurors will be more likely to be predisposed towards the defense. We will rst present and discuss
results that conrm this prediction for the trials in our dataset. We interpret this as conrmation
of the basic validity of our model.
The second prediction is less amenable to empirical verication. The model suggests that
skilled and empowered defense attorneys can end up manipulating the racial composition of juries
in various ways in their pursuit of jurors with inclinations towards their side. The precise direction
and magnitude of the eect on racial composition depends upon the mechanisms of empowerment
that are operative and on the information that the attorneys for a given trial are able to learn
about potential jurors, which we cannot observe. Therefore, if we observe skill and empowerment
aecting the racial composition of juries in a certain direction, we cannot view this as conrmation
of this prediction. Our approach will be to rst test for a racial composition eect, and then to infer
from this what we can about the benets that attorneys are able to obtain from empowerment,
under the assumption that our theoretical model is correct. We will also attempt to support our
inferences by examining evidence on the number of strikes exercised during voir dire.
4.1 Question 1: Can Attorneys Retain Jurors Based on Predispositions?
Our chosen indicator of juror predispositions, as discussed in the previous section, is measured on
an ordinal seven-point scale. The primary empirical strategy we pursue is to use this variable in its
original form within an ordered logistic framework. The main explanatory variables of interest are
30This is perhaps unexpectedly low, as there is a general perception of resource-constrained District Attorneys'
Oces being at a disadvantage relative to large private law rms representing defendants. Indeed, the defense
attorneys in our dataset tend to be older and more experienced than their counterparts. However, over half of the
trials in our sample involved a public defender (ranging from a third of trials in the Bronx to nearly three quarters in
Los Angeles), and there is also a general perception of Public Defenders' Oces competing ineectively against private
law rms for talented defense attorneys. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that exceptional law students are
attracted to District Attorneys' Oces out of law school because of the opportunity to gain trial experience early in
their careers.
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Table 2: Prediction #1 (Ordered Logistic Regressions)
Dep. Var. = Juror Predisposition (1 (pros.) to 7 (def.))
(1) (2) (3)






EvidenceStrongerforDefense 0.3623 0.3740 0.3865
(0.2957) (0.2986) (0.3030)
EvidenceStrongerforProsecution -0.6554*** -0.6554*** -0.6714***
(0.1425) (0.1416) (0.1417)
JurorIncome 0.0563 0.0644 0.0636
(0.0980) (0.0983) (0.0986)
JurorEducation 0.3384 0.3168 0.3212
(0.3118) (0.3194) (0.3208)
JurorRace(Non-White/White) 0.3328*** 0.3335*** 0.3310***
(0.0992) (0.0999) (0.0999)
JurorGender(Female/Male) 0.0402 0.0363 0.0351
(0.0745) (0.0750) (0.0751)
JurorReligiousness 0.0292 0.0115 0.0039
(0.0860) (0.0865) (0.0856)
JurorAge -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0018
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Wald 2 139.55 142.59 140.33
Log-likelihood -3376.2 -3372.9 -3374.3
# jurors 1846 1846 1846
# trials 251 251 251
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the trial level, are in parentheses. All trials with non-missing data for
at least one juror are included. Each equation includes controls for county, crime type, and defendant and victim
characteristics, all of which have been suppressed in the table, along with the estimated ordered logistic cut points.
*p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01, based on two-tailed z-test.
our measure of attorney empowerment, our measure of relative attorney skill, and most importantly,
their interaction. We also control for as many trial-level and additional juror-level characteristics
as possible. Each observation is an individual juror, and standard errors are adjusted to account
for intra-trial correlation. Table 2 presents our main results.
The rst column of Table 2 purposely omits the interaction between attorney empowerment
and relative skill. The results suggest that attorney empowerment and the presence of a more
skilled defense attorney are separately associated with large and statistically signicant increases
in the probability that a seated juror will be predisposed towards the defense.31 Taking this at
31The table presents the ordered logistic estimated coecients. These are marginal eects on the cumulative
log-odds ratio of a juror's response being higher on the seven-point scale than a given cut-o category. Table 3
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face value for the moment, this is an unexpected result: legal scholars and commentators typically
assume that greater attorney involvement in voir dire is detrimental to the defense.
The second column of Table 2 reports what the theoretical model suggests is the \correct"
specication, and the results are perhaps closer to expectations. The explanatory power of the
model improves with the addition of the interaction eect, and moreover, this interaction eect
accounts for much of the separate eects in the rst specication.
The results in the second column provide qualied conrmation of the theoretical model. They
suggest that when attorneys are empowered and the defense attorney is relatively more skilled, there
is a signicant and substantially higher probability that seated jurors will be favorably inclined
towards the defense. The combination of skill and empowerment is crucial to deliver this eect in
the model: empowerment can provide both attorneys with a greater ability to strike undersirable
potential jurors, but it is the combination of this with the greater skill of the defense attorney that
sharpens the defense attorney's striking ability and allows it to be directed more protably.
The model also predicts, when taken very literally, that the defense attorney's greater skill
should have no eect on the probability that a seated juror has favoritism for the defense when
attorneys are not empowered. This is the case because the model was constructed such that skill
is only useful to attorneys in utilizing the benets that come with empowerment. The results in
the second column of Table 2 broadly conrm this aspect of the model in substance: the estimated
coecient on `Defense More Skilled' is positive but statistically insignicant. On the other hand,
it would also seem reasonable that the skill of defense attorneys could be partially manifested
in in
uencing juror inclinations through arguments during trial, which the imprecisely-estimated
positive coecient could be capturing.
The reason that the results in the second column are only a qualied conrmation of the
model lies in the construction of our measure of relative attorney skill. The excluded category of
this dummy variable represents trials in which the prosecutor was strictly more skilled than the
defense attorney. The theoretical model is reversible according to which attorney is assumed to
have the greater skill, so the opposite prediction should hold when it is the prosecutor who is more
skilled: the probability that a seated juror is predisposed towards the defense should be lower
when attorneys are empowered and the prosecutor is more skilled. We would therefore expect
the estimated coecient on the main empowerment eect to be negative. Instead, the results in
the second column show that this eect is positive, though not statistically dierent from zero.
This suggests that prosecutors in our dataset are less able to leverage empowerment and a skill
advantage in jury selection than their colleagues across the aisle, though potential explanations for
this remain elusive.
The third column of Table 2 takes the theoretical model literally and imposes the zero eect
below displays ordinary least squares regression results for the same specications as Table 2, which provide a more
straightforward interpretation of marginal eects.
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of attorney skill when attorneys are not empowered. The eect of empowerment when the defense
attorney is the more skilled becomes larger and more statistically signicant, while the eect when
the prosecutor is the more skilled remains positive but is closer to zero.
There are some important eects associated with the control variables that should be brie
y
examined. These eects are nearly identical across the three specications. First, non-white jurors
have a signicantly and substantially higher likelihood of being predisposed to the defense than
white jurors. This corresponds with a primitive assumption of our theoretical model and with much
anecdotal and empirical evidence.
Second, when the evidence is strong for the prosecution's case, seated jurors are much less likely
to report having favored the defense. This is a sensible and encouraging result. On the other hand,
when the evidence is strong for the defense's case, seated jurors are only somewhat more likely
to report a predisposition towards the defense, and this eect is not statistically signicant. This
result is sensible in direction, and though somewhat weak, should be considered in the context of
the purposeful intention of the judicial system to avoid false convictions, which could lead many
jurors to view weak or osetting evidence (the excluded category) as being in favor of the defendant.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the estimated eects of strength of evidence is the context
they provide for interpreting the magnitude of the eect of the interaction between empowerment
and skill. The specication in the third column suggests that the successes of skilled and empowered
defense attorneys in jury selection can be substantial enough to oset the disadvantage from being
faced with evidence supporting the prosecution. This is a potentially unsettling nding from the
perspective of debates on the role of jury selection in the service of justice.
Controls for county, type of crime, and defendant and victim characteristics have been sup-
pressed in the table, and for the most part are not associated with important eects. One interest-
ing result is that, conditional on there being a victim of the alleged crime, if the victim was female,
jurors were signicantly less likely to report a predisposition towards the defense.
Table 3 presents ordinary least squares regression results corresponding to the specications
in Table 2. The sets of results do not dier substantively, but the latter give a better sense of
magnitudes.32 In column (2), the estimated coecient on the interaction term is 0.52, implying
that, when the defense attorney is more skilled, attorney empowerment leads to an increase by
about half a point on the seven-point favoritism scale for the average seated juror.33
32The estimated ordered logistic cut-points for the specications in Table 2 do not indicate a great deal of non-
linearity in the underlying latent favoritism variable, lending some justication to treating the raw seven-point variable
as a continuous, cardinal measure.
33Results are also similar for random eects specications, either GLS with the dependent variable in its original
form, or probit, with the dependent variable transformed to a dummy variable for favoritism ratings of 5 or higher
versus 4 or lower.
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Table 3: Prediction #1 (OLS Regressions)
Dep. Var. = Juror Predisposition (1 (pros.) to 7 (def.))
(1) (2) (3)






EvidenceStrongerforDefense 0.4526 0.4668 0.4819
(0.3080) (0.3071) (0.3106)
EvidenceStrongerforProsecution -0.7008*** -0.7017*** -0.7205***
(0.1506) (0.1495) (0.1489)
JurorIncome 0.0334 0.0415 0.0418
(0.1045) (0.1047) (0.1051)
JurorEducation 0.3519 0.3349 0.3382
(0.3024) (0.3050) (0.3058)
JurorRace(Non-White/White) 0.3775*** 0.3803*** 0.3801***
(0.1094) (0.1099) (0.1101)
JurorGender(Female/Male) 0.0691 0.0675 0.0659
(0.0823) (0.0824) (0.0826)
JurorReligiousness 0.0246 0.0099 0.0011
(0.0943) (0.0941) (0.0932)
JurorAge -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036)
F 7.95 7.67 7.80
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13
# jurors 1846 1846 1846
# trials 251 251 251
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the trial level, are in parentheses. All trials with non-missing data for
at least one juror are included. Each equation includes a constant term and controls for county, crime type, and
defendant and victim characteristics, all of which have been suppressed in the table. *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05,
***p < 0:01, based on two-tailed z-test.
4.1.1 Alternative Measures of Attorney Empowerment
The results presented thus far make use of our main indicator of attorney empowerment, which,
as discussed previously, is a dummy variable for whether either high attorney participation or a
supplementary juror questionnaire were allowed. Table 4 repeats column (1) of Table 2 with several
alternatives for capturing attorney empowerment. Column (4) of Table 4 reproduces column (1) of
Table 2 verbatim.
The rst two columns consider the two main instruments potentially available to attorneys
separately. Comparing with column (4), it appears that the eect of a supplementary questionnaire
is biased by the omission of the indicator for high participation. The third column presents a
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specication fully capturing the eects of the two instruments in any combination. The large and
positive eect from high participation is again present, while the eect of having a questionnaire
alone is positive but insignicant. The total net eect from having both instruments together is
positive but not statistically dierent from zero.34
Table 4: Alternative Measures of Attorney Empowerment (Ordered Logistic Regressions)
Dep. Var. = Juror Predisposition (1 (pros.) to 7 (def.))

















Wald 2 126.05 118.83 142.23 139.55 141.36
Log-likelihood -3376.9 -3385.7 -3374.0 -3376.2 -3246.5
# of jurors 1846 1846 1846 1846 1775
# of trials 251 251 251 251 239
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the trial level, are in parentheses. All trials with non-missing data for
at least one juror are included. Each equation includes controls for attorney skill, strength of evidence, juror
characteristics, county, crime type, and defendant and victim characteristics, all of which have been suppressed in
the table, along with the estimated ordered logistic cut points. *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01, based on
two-tailed z-test.
The specication in column (4) { representing our preferred measure of empowerment { is
equivalent to that in column (3) under two parameter restrictions: the high participation eect is
equal to the questionnaire eect; and the eect from having both instruments is equal to the negative
of the eect of having either individually. The null hypothesis that this composite parameter
restriction holds cannot be rejected against the two-sided alternative.35
The advantage of our chosen measure of empowerment is that it can parsimoniously yet com-
prehensively capture the potential that attorneys had to acquire information on jurors for any
34The p-value of the two-sided test is 0.20.
35The Wald statistic with two degrees of freedom is 1.99, and the associated p-value of the test is 0.37.
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given trial. Table 4 at least provides no evidence of a statistical basis for preferring an alternative
measure. On the other hand, the same broadly holds true for measuring empowerment with the in-
dicator for high participation alone, though it is a less comprehensive measure.36 We have repeated
selected specications replacing our chosen measure of empowerment with high participation, and
have found no substantive dierence in results.
Finally, column (5) of Table 4 includes other variables related to attorney empowerment along
with our baseline measure. The availability of a higher number of peremptory strikes unequivocally
increases attorneys' ability to strike additional potential jurors. However, we do not observe the
potential number of peremptory strikes available, but only the number actually exercised by each
side. When attorneys are able to strike the jurors they would like to for cause, they may have
no need for the total number of peremptory strikes allowed them. Therefore, a lower number of
peremptory strikes actually exercised could indicate a low number available and hence a low level
of empowerment on the one hand, or a high level of empowerment and unexercised peremptory
challenges on the other hand. In addition, judges have a high degree of discretion over the number
of peremptory strikes allowed, and often increase the number based on the severity of the charge
and other aspects of the case. The inclusion of these additional variables adds little explanatory
power to the regression, and provides little insight in general.
4.1.2 Evaluating our Measure of Attorney Skill
As discussed in the previous section, our measure of attorney skill is based on an index of relative
skill constructed from survey questions asked of judges and jurors. We rst argue that this index
captures relevant aspects of actual attorney skill. Table 5 shows the results of linear regressions of
the skill index on the few attorney characteristics for which data are available.37
Previous legal experience of the defense attorney is associated with a greater relative skill
rating. This eect is statistically signicant but small. Previous legal experience of the prosecuting
attorney has an osetting negative eect, as would be expected, but this is small and not statistically
signicant. In addition, specic criminal experience for either attorney is not associated with
an important eect on relative skill. On the other hand, there is an overwhelming positive and
signicant eect on the skill index when the defense attorney is a woman. We interpret this as
potentially embodying a selection eect: female defense attorneys entrusted with lead counsel
duties are likely to be more highly skilled and talented than their male counterparts if they suer
statistical discrimination throughout their career.38 Thus, our chosen measure of relative attorney
36The specication in column (3) collapses to that in column (1) under the restriction that the coecients for
`Questionnaire' and `both' are jointly equal to zero. The test of this null hypothesis against a two-sided alternative
yields a Wald statistic with two degrees of freedom of 2.37 and a p-value of 0.31.
37Each observation in the regressions in Table 5 is a trial, because all variables vary only at the trial level. As
mentioned previously, attorney response rates were low compared to other parties, so the number of trials represented
in this table is lower than in others.
38See Lehmann (2011) for a discussion of this eect for blacks in large law rms.
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Table 5: Determinants of Attorney Skill (OLS Regressions)
Dep. Var. = Index of Attorney Skill (def. rating minus pros. rating)
(1) (2) (3)
YearsPracticeDefense 0.0422*** 0.0405** 0.0380**
(0.0156) (0.0185) (0.0175)






AgeDefense -0.0136 -0.0097 -0.0103
(0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0109)
AgeProsec 0.0057 0.0066 0.0089
(0.0185) (0.0190) (0.0187)
GenderDef(Female/Male) 0.4709** 0.5241** 0.5295**
(0.2006) (0.2510) (0.2473)
GenderProsec(Female/Male) -0.1504 -0.0943 -0.1196
(0.1971) (0.2145) (0.2020)
Controls No Yes Yes
F 1.80 1.71 1.83
R2 0.06 0.15 0.14
# of trials 174 152 152
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each equation includes a constant term, which has been
suppressed in the table. In addition, the second and third columns include controls for county, crime type, and
selected defendant and victim characteristics, which have also been suppressed in the table. See the text for a
description of the dependent variable. *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01, based on two-tailed z-test.
skill appears to be a valid indicator of at least some objective aspects of attorney skill.
We have attempted to gauge the robustness of our main results on juror predispositions to
alternative treatments of attorney skill, with limited success. The primary concern with our measure
of relative attorney skill, notwithstanding the results of Table 5, is that it is partially based on juror
responses. Some jurors could have a tendency to report a predisposition towards the attorney they
found to be skilled and vice versa, which would introduce simultaneity between our dependent and
explanatory variables.39 Even though we are most focused on the eect of the interaction between
skill and empowerment on juror leanings rather than the direct skill eect itself, this potential
simultaneity problem is one that we would like to address. The issue that we have encountered
39The same eects appearing in Table 5 also appear in specications focusing on the separate ratings for the
defense or prosecution by judges and jurors. In addition, some specications examining skill ratings reported by
jurors indicate that higher juror religiousness is associated with a greater likelihood of giving the prosecutor a high
skill rating. Other juror characteristics { most notably race { are not signicantly correlated with the skill ratings
given to either attorney. Since juror predispositions are correlated with race but not religiousness in our data, this
suggests that the skill ratings given by jurors are not necessarily biased by their predispositions.
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in attempting to do so is that the interaction eect becomes very imprecisely estimated when the
estimating sample changes.
The results in Table 5 suggest a natural instrumental variables approach to diagnosing and
correcting for any simultaneity between juror predispositions and our measure of attorney skill.
Attorney experience and gender are correlated with the skill ratings of attorneys, but should be
exogenous to the way that jurors responded to their surveys, making these variables good candi-
dates to be used as instruments for our measure of skill in regressions explaining the predispositions
of seated jurors. Two problems are encountered when attempting to implement such an IV strat-
egy: the sample size is smaller because the number of trials for which attorney characteristics
are available is lower than for other variables; and these attorney characteristics are not strong
instruments for the attorney skill measure. Both of these problems lead to imprecisely-estimated
coecients, to such a degree that statistical comparisons with our main results on predispositions
are not meaningful.
We have also attempted to replace our main skill measure with one based only on the skill ratings
given by the judge, dropping all trials for which the attorneys received the same skill rating. This
results in the loss of about half of the sample, and again, the coecients are imprecisely estimated
as a consequence. Modied Hausman tests against our main specications indicate no statistical
dierence, but this is driven by the particularly wide condence interval for the estimated interaction
eect between empowerment and skill in the alternative specications.
A less extreme variation on this is to base the indicator for a more highly skilled defense attorney
on a skill index that varies by juror, with the jury component of the skill index calculated using
only the responses of the other jurors from the same trial. This causes a small reduction in the
sample size because some trials have just a single juror response. The results are not statistically
or qualitatively dierent from our main results on juror predispositions, but are less precisely
estimated.
Finally, we have employed measures of absolute attorney skill in some specications in order
to broaden our focus beyond simple skill asymmetries. The results suggest that empowerment
increases the likelihood that a seated juror will be predisposed to the defense to a greater degree
when the defense attorney has a higher skill rating from the judge. The eects of the prosecutor's
skill rating are very imprecisely estimated, and more generally, these specications have lower
explanatory power than our main specications. This is perhaps an indication that the attorney
skill ratings, measured on a subjective seven-point scale, are more applicable for making relative
comparisons within a trial.
4.1.3 Summary
We have discussed evidence that the more highly skilled attorney can indeed leverage empowerment
in voir dire to retain jurors based on their predispositions. This result matches the main prediction
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of our theoretical model.
Our results have been shown to be moderately robust to dierent specications and alternative
measures of attorney empowerment. For attorney skill, it may perhaps be more accurate to say
that we are simply not able to convincingly demonstrate robustness or non-robustness given our
data.
We now proceed to examine further predictions of our model, retaining our preferred measures
of attorney empowerment and skill.
4.2 Question 2: Do Attorneys Retain Jurors Based on Race?
Table 6 examines the eect of attorney empowerment and skill on the probability that a seated
juror is non-white. Our treatment of the two is the same as in Table 2: column (1) includes
the main eects only; column (2) introduces their interaction in addition; and column (3) retains
the interaction eect but restricts the main skill eect to be zero. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable, with whites as the excluded category. All specications include several trial-level
controls.40 Each observation is an individual juror, and standard errors are adjusted to account
for intra-trial correlation. We have chosen the logistic functional form for the results we will focus
on.41
The main message of Table 6 is that there is no eect of attorney empowerment in voir dire on
the racial composition of seated juries, regardless of attorney skill. The estimated logit coecients
for the main eects and the interaction term are small in magnitude and statistically insignicant.
Instead, the county xed eects account for much of the explanatory power of the regressions. That
is, whatever the attorneys accomplish in jury selection regarding the leanings of the jurors they
retain, the racial composition of the seated jury is driven almost entirely by the demographics of
the jury pool and other county-level eects.42
The table presents coecients rather than marginal eects. The estimated marginal eect of
attorney empowerment on the probability of a seated juror being non-white from the specication
in column (2) { averaged over the estimating sample, with the defense as the more highly skilled
attorney and other variables unchanged { is 1.7 percentage points, with a 95% condence interval
of -4.3 percentage points to 7.7 percentage points. On a twelve-person jury, this amounts to the
exclusion or inclusion of less than one additional non-white juror. In contrast, moving a trial
from L.A. County (with a 50% non-white population) to Bronx County (with a 90% non-white
40Juror characteristics have been omitted from these regressions to avoid simultaneity with the dependent variable.
This accounts for the larger sample size compared to Table 2
41This functional form assumption does not appear to be important. Results are similar for linear specications
and for probit specications with or without random eects. Further, multinomial logistic results do not indicate
important dierences for Blacks and Hispanics, the two primary non-white racial groups in the data.
42These conclusions remain true when considering the alternative measures of attorney empowerment explored in
the previous section.
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Table 6: Prediction #2 (Logistic Regressions)
Dep. Var. = Juror Race (Non-White / White)
(1) (2) (3)






LA -1.1702*** -1.1715*** -1.1713***
(0.1839) (0.1843) (0.1843)
Maricopa -3.1249*** -3.1284*** -3.1311***
(0.1996) (0.2030) (0.2026)
DC -1.4966*** -1.4974*** -1.4948***
(0.1689) (0.1694) (0.1696)
Wald 2 339.13 345.83 340.73
Log-likelihood -1409.8 -1409.8 -1409.9
# of jurors 2410 2410 2410
# of trials 282 282 282
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the trial level, are in parentheses. All trials with non- missing data for
at least one juror are included. Each equation includes a constant term and controls for crime type and defendant
and victim characteristics, all of which have been suppressed in the table. *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01, based
on two-tailed z-test.
population) would increase the estimated probability of a seated juror being non-white by 21.3
percentage points on average, or 2.5 non-white jurors on a twelve-person jury.43
Our theoretical model does not predict a zero eect on racial composition of seated juries.
Rather, it predicts an eect { potentially large { in either direction depending on how attorneys
leverage empowerment. If empowerment is eective simply by allowing attorneys to nd convincing
grounds to have jurors dismissed for cause, a more highly skilled defense attorney will strike more
white panelists than otherwise. On the other hand, if empowerment provides attorneys with strong
information regarding juror leanings (in addition to increasing striking ability or not), a more highly
skilled defense attorney could choose to retain only those jurors appearing to be predisposed to the
defense, regardless of race, and thus end up with a higher proportion of whites on the seated jury
than would otherwise be the case. In the context of these predictions, we interpret our empirical
results as indicating a mix of these various empowerment eects across the trials in our sample.
43The change in racial composition due to empowerment, though small in a practical sense, may nonetheless be
important for trial outcomes. The ndings of Lehmann and Smith (2011), however, do not suggest that this is the
case: using the same data as have been employed here, a ten percentage point increase in the proportion of blacks on
seated juries was found to be about one quarter as eective at reducing conviction rates as increases in the strength
of evidence for the defense.
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That is, in at least some of the trials, attorneys were able to leverage empowerment to learn valuable
information about jurors that would otherwise remain unobserved.
4.3 Supporting Evidence from the Number of Panelists Struck
Corollary predictions concerning the number of strikes exercised during voir dire can also be ex-
tracted from our model. As with predictions about race, these predictions about number of strikes
are dependent upon the specic functions of empowerment. For example, when empowerment
only increases attorney striking ability, Assumption 2 implies that more panelists will be struck
in expectation, as both attorneys will have a greater striking success rate than otherwise. If, in-
stead, empowerment only provides information on juror predispositions and the defense attorney
chooses to strike white panelists exhibiting the low signal only, there will be fewer panelists struck
in expectation, as no white panelists exhibiting the high signal will be struck.
Table 7 examines the eect of attorney empowerment and skill on the number of strikes exercised
during voir dire. The same specications as shown in Table 6 for race are employed, with the
inclusion of additional controls for other aspects of the voir dire process. The dependent variable is
the total number of strikes exercised, including all strikes for cause and the number of peremptory
strikes exercised by each side.44 Each observation is a trial, and the estimation procedure is ordinary
least squares.
As with race, we nd little signicant eect of empowerment, skill, or their interaction on
the number of strikes exercised during voir dire. The results in column (2) suggest that defense
attorneys strike slightly fewer panelists when they have a skill advantage compared to prosecutors.
However, neither the main empowerment eect (representing cases in which the prosecutor was
relatively more skilled) nor the interaction with the indicator for the defense attorney being more
skilled is statistically dierent from zero.45 Both coecients are estimated imprecisely, so that fairly
substantial eects in either direction cannot be ruled out. Most of the explanatory power of the
regressions comes from the county xed eects: judge tendencies and state guidelines generally lead
to fewer potential peremptory challenges being available to attorneys in Los Angeles and Maricopa
compared to the other counties.
In principle, we could attempt to better characterize how the attorneys in our dataset leveraged
empowerment in voir dire by examining the model's joint predictions concerning race and number
of strikes, and comparing them with our empirical results. For example, if we had found that
44Strikes for cause outnumber total peremptory strikes for many trials, but for some cases, the number of strikes
for cause is reported as zero. We suspect that these are cases for which the entire venire was examined for cause out
of the presence of court clerks, before the sequential exercise of peremptory challenges was begun (and also that the
panel size reported for these trials refers to the size of the remaining venire after strikes for cause). We caution that
the data on strikes for cause are therefore likely to be incomplete. However, results are similar when each of these
three categories of strikes is examined individually, so we err on the side of using the more comprehensive dependent
variable.
45Indeed, the coecients are jointly insignicant (p=0.51) and not statistically dierent from one another (p=0.25).
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Table 7: Number of Strikes (OLS Regressions)
Dep. Var. = Total Number of Strikes
(1) (2) (3)






LA -12.2622*** -12.2266*** -12.2374***
(3.8777) (3.9086) (3.8969)
Maricopa -10.0843** -10.1940** -10.1859**
(4.1083) (4.1215) (4.1144)
DC 1.1096 1.1691 1.1342
(2.9243) (2.9421) (2.9325)
F 15.29 14.57 15.44
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45
# of trials 276 276 276
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All trials with non- missing data for at least one juror are
included. Each equation includes a constant term and controls for crime type, defendant and victim characteristics,
and length of voir dire, all of which have been suppressed in the table. *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01, based on
two-tailed z-test.
empowerment was associated both with a lower proportion of non-whites on seated juries and with
a lower number of strikes in trials for which the defense attorney had a skill advantage, we could
infer that attorneys were often in the situation like the second example mentioned above: i.e. with
the information aspect of empowerment dominating, and with the high signal rare enough in the
population that the defense attorney attempts to retain all but white panelists exhibiting the low
signal.
Unfortunately, our present results do not shed further light on the role played by empowerment
in the trials in our dataset. The small and insignicant eects on both racial composition and num-
ber of strikes could indicate varying prominence of the striking ability and information functions of
empowerment across trials, along with variation in the quality of the signals of juror predispositions
that skilled and empowered attorneys were able to obtain. In this sense, the results for number of
strikes do provide some corroborating evidence in support of the results for racial composition. A
strong eect on number of strikes in either direction combined with no eect on racial composition,
on average for the sample, could not be convincingly explained within our model.
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4.4 Alternative Interpretations
We interpret our results as providing reasonable conrmation of our model, and of the general
hypothesis that attorney empowerment in voir dire can increase the ability of attorneys both to
have potential jurors removed and to learn more about them. However, there are alternative
explanations for why we might see the interaction of empowerment and skill leading to an eect on
juror favoritism but not on juror race.
One such explanation is that attorneys may use voir dire less for striking and learning about
jurors, and more for testing and laying the groundwork for arguments to be raised during trial.
Skilled attorneys aorded this opportunity could potentially be indierent about the race and any
other characteristics of the jurors hearing the case, so long as those jurors could be suciently
groomed and prepared beginning in voir dire. If attorneys often made use of empowerment in
voir dire to this eect, one might expect to see fewer strikes for trials in which attorneys were
empowered. However, as discussed above, there are also cases for which our model predicts that
the combination of skill and empowerment will be associated with fewer strikes than otherwise.
It is therefore not clear that these alternative hypotheses about the role of empowerment could
be convincingly tested against one another based on number of strikes alone. However, it can be
noted that column (1) of Table 7 shows a small and positive (though highly insignicant) net eect
of empowerment on number of strikes in our data, which perhaps indicates that attorneys in our
dataset did not always use empowerment in voir dire simply to prepare potential jurors.
Another concern is that our measure of attorney empowerment could be capturing unobserved
judge eects. For example, judges who routinely grant in-depth attorney participation in voir
dire may hold subtle sympathies for defendants and defense attorneys in general, which could also
be re
ected in other relevant aspects of the trial, such as the instructions given to the jury, the
evidence admitted, and the attorney motions allowed. Unfortunately, the data include neither
judge identiers nor even basic demographic information. We plan to address this question in the
future by leveraging cross-county variation in the data to test selected comparative statics of our
model. If the empirical results of this exercise correspond more with the political leanings of judges
in certain counties than with the model's predictions, such judge eects may deserve more serious
consideration.
Finally, it should be mentioned that few criminal charges end up going to trial and terminating
with a jury verdict.46 There are manifold factors at play determining which cases see the court-
room, from the presence of mandatory minimum sentences to chance interactions between attorneys
attempting to work out a plea bargain. It is unclear how we might meaningfully assess which of
many potential selection eects might be aecting our results, and to what degree. We leave a
more detailed investigation of this matter for future work.
46The gure in 2004 was about 4% of nearly 84,000 felony defendants, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
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5 Conclusion
This paper is the most complete attempt to date to measure what attorneys can actually accomplish,
given varying degrees of empowerment in jury selection, in terms of multiple characteristics of the
seated jurors they manage to retain. We have constructed a model of attorney behavior in which
empowerment can operate through multiple channels, and in which the benets of empowerment
can depend on attorney skill. We have demonstrated that, in this model, skilled and empowered
attorneys can successfully stack the jury with favorably-inclined jurors, but that this is equally
true for the defense as for the prosecution, and further, that this is not necessarily accomplished
by manipulating the racial composition of juries in predictable ways. Finally, we have veried the
validity of our model empirically, and found that its main prediction holds in our sample of felony
trials in four large and diverse counties.
Our results are surprising in relation to previous work and to received wisdom, but less so in
light of the more realistically sophisticated attorney behavior that we allow for. The attorneys in
our sample end up altering the racial composition of the seated jury relative to the jury pool very
little when empowered: equivalent to no more than one juror of a given race in either direction on
a twelve-person jury. The implication in the context of our model is that, for at least some of the
trials in our dataset, empowerment in voir dire allowed attorneys to uncover valuable information
about jurors and to avoid using racial stereotypes as a crutch.
An important question is how our results might generalize to other regions not represented
in our dataset. History is replete with examples of black defendants being convicted by all-white
juries, and with rst-hand accounts of prosecutors using peremptory challenges to remove each
of the few black panelists summoned for potential jury duty only to be perfunctorily sent back
home. Such examples do not invalidate our model or its predictions so much as they underline
the necessity of exploring its comparative statics more carefully. In some counties, blacks may
have very strong predispositions towards the defense on average, while making up a very small
fraction of the population and juror roll. Other counties may be very racially diverse, but have
very little variation in average predispositions across racial groups. In either of these examples, the
benet from empowerment for even the most skilled defense attorney is likely to be minimal, even
if empowerment yields very detailed information about the jurors. This would especially be the
case if minorities are underrepresented in jury pools and typical court procedures routinely make
a large enough number of peremptory challenges available that the prosecution can easily remove
any minority panelists. This situation may aptly describe many small jurisdictions, particularly in
the south. It cannot be handled well within our current modeling framework. We therefore suspect
that the strength of our empirical results { and perhaps the broader validity of our model { will not
extend outside of large and racially diverse counties such as the ones represented in our dataset,
and are leery of making any claims to the contrary without substantial further work.
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Notwithstanding these concerns about generalizabilty, however, we do think that our present
work can make a small contribution to policy discussions. Many commentators have raised concerns
about jury selection practices, both from the perspective of potential unfairness to the defendant and
potential discrimination against minority panelists. These commentators are virtually unanimous
in their calls for the abolition of peremptory strikes, which are currently employed by the American
justice system to a much greater degree than anywhere else in the world.47 We submit that
peremptory challenges are something of a red herring in these discussions. Specically, our results
suggest that inequality in attorney skill may be of equal importance { where this can be interpreted
broadly as inequality in the resources and support available to each side for a given trial.
It would seem that collecting greater amounts of juror information should only aid in accom-
plishing the intended aim of voir dire { literally, to induce panelists to \speak the truth" about their
biases and ability to be impartial. However, if one side lacks the skill or resources to interpret such
information, this opens the door for opposing counsel to abuse this advantage by, far from seeking
impartial jurors, seeking the most favorably-inclined jurors that can be slipped past the other side.
Gobert et al. (2009) have suggested that large courthouses should employ analysts that both sides
for a given trial can have equal access to in gaining assistance with jury selection. This seems like
a worthwhile proposal to explore further, in that it could preserve the benets of collecting a large
amount of information from panelists, while leveling the playing eld in how attorneys are able to
use this information. On the other hand, if this only aided attorneys in arguing in greater detail
over semantic points rather than in actually learning about the panelists, the time and resource
costs of the court would perhaps need to be given greater consideration. Again, however, our results
suggest that attorneys in our dataset utilized empowerment to acquire useful information rather
than just to bolster striking success in at least some cases.
We have focused on juror race for the majority of the paper, but it should be reiterated that
the model only relies on the existence of any observable characteristic that is correlated with
juror leanings. What constitutes observability to attorneys is not altogether clear, but virtually all
courthouses collect rudimentary information on panelists' occupations and employment. Therefore,
most basic sociodemographic information should be at least partially observable. Lehmann and
Smith (2011) nd a relation between average jury income and propensity to convict, which thus
seems like an obvious characteristic to incorporate in our analysis, though early indications are that
there is not a great correlation between individual juror income and predispositions in our data.
More immediately, we plan to continue generalizing our model, and to explore its comparative
statics theoretically and empirically.
In a sense, the present paper can be thought of as one step towards theoretically linking the
empirical strategies of Anwar, Bayer and Hjalmarsson (2011) and Lehmann and Smith (2011).
The former document a correlation between the composition of jury pools and verdicts; and the
47See, for example, Homan (2006).
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latter document a correlation between the composition of seated juries and verdicts. The present
paper is about how jury selection transforms jury pools into seated juries. Can attorneys cause the
distributions by race and predispositions of people on seated juries to dier from those of people
in the corresponding starting jury pools? The second step would be to go from the distributions of
race and predispositions on seated juries to the verdicts that those seated juries deliver, which would
entail an examination of group dynamics in jury deliberations. As an extreme example, the work
of Sunstein (2000) suggests that a jury with only a few members exhibiting weak pre-deliberation
leanings towards conviction could lead to \group polarization" and a unanimous decision to convict
under various deliberation conditions. We found indications that group decision-making eects
were at play in Lehmann and Smith (2011), and their potential to arise is also discussed by Anwar,
Bayer and Hjalmarsson (2011) in interpreting their results. Bowers et al. (2001) provide a valuable
catalogue of types of racial interaction that occurred during deliberations in their sample of capital
trials. We also plan to address this question of deliberation dynamics more carefully in future work
as part of our overall project on jury selection.
The interest amongst economists in jury selection and legal ndings, though for the most part
very recent, should perhaps not be surprising. The legal system presents a high-stakes environment
in which a number of individuals are making constrained choices, sometimes with strategic con-
siderations. Such an environment provides a wide array of interesting questions to economists and
decision scientists. Unfortunately { and unexpectedly given the volume of legal activity passing
through courtrooms on a daily basis48 { data that would enable such questions to be satisfactorily
addressed are for the most part lacking. The few econometric studies discussed in the introduction
have all made use of customized self-collected datasets of one sort or another. The dataset that we
have employed is unique and of great value in the richness of the information it contains, but the
number of trials it covers leaves something to be desired. The more general point is that growth in
this part of the literature is currently severely constrained by data availability, not by any dearth
of interesting questions remaining to be answered.
48Mize et al. (2007) estimate that state courts alone conduct nearly 150,000 jury trials per year, despite a steady
increase in the frequency of various non-trial dispositions { itself an interesting phenomenon.
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